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The major assets of the Human Rights programme are substantial, and some of them are
easily counted. The Universal Declaration - championed by Cassin and chronicled by
Sohn1 - has enlarged the meaning of the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter, and is within the frame of reference of almost every United Nations debate.
Lauterpacht 2 laid the foundations for sound legal development by tracing the Charter
provisions to their heritage in existing law. Other writers3 of the first rank have helped to
change the perspectives of international law to conform with the Charter goals of
universality and of ultimate concern for individual human rights. It is the measure of these
changes that the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, writing in
celebration of Human Rights Year, is able to affirm:
The Universal Declaration does now represent in written form the basis for the law of nations,
the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience as accepted in the 20th
Century.
Unfortunately, this message has not yet made much stir outside the small world of
scholarship. The cause of human rights can hardly be more effective than the world
organisation it serves; and neither commands the ultimate loyalty of sovereign states. For
the peoples of these sovereign states, the transactions of the United Nations are often little
* Professor of Law, 1968-1984.
1 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, Special issue for Human Rights Year.
2 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (Stevens, London, 1950).
3 Wolfgang Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press, New
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more than a shadow-play, bearing repeated and unwelcome witness to the jealousies,
inequalities and irrationalities of a bitterly divided world.
There are areas within which such negative forces may yield to a constructive sentiment.
The sheer necessities of modern living demand the international regulation of postal and
telecommunication services, aviation, quarantine and a host of other practical matters: in
these respects sovereign states will accept direction as submissively as any ratepayer. The
claims of humanity are a less insistent voice, but not a negligible one: under the spur of an
enlightened public opinion, Governments contribute more or less generously to international
aid projects - though without the sense of commitment which they feel for the relief of want
in their own national communities.
In other areas there is no comparable public demand for action which transcends
narrowly conceived national interests. Between the conception of a world order and its
actuality falls the shadow of state sovereignty. National and supra-national goals are
reconciled only in limited contexts or exceptional cases. In the field of labour relations -
where there has been some tradition of solidarity across national frontiers in the
confrontation between workers and employers - international regulation has achieved its
greatest success. Among Western European countries which already feel a compulsion to
pool their resources and destinies, regional institutions in the human rights field have
quietly attained a position of real authority.
The United Nations, lacking the propellant of Great Power unanimity or of dedicated
world-wide popular support, has in a sense always been dependent on auxiliary sources of
energy. By far the most constant of these auxiliary sources have been the rising demands of
the newly independent and less developed countries for an end to colonialism and to racial
discrimination, and for better standards of living. It was natural that these demands should
find expression not only in the committees concerned with concrete political problems. From
the early days of the United Nations, the process of formulating standards has been carried
on in the Third Committee of the General Assembly and it has been the responsibility of the
Human Rights Commission to furnish drafts.
At first it must have seemed almost a non-political task to give general currency to the
constitutional guarantees which older democratic countries have usually accorded their
own citizens. Before long, however, the representatives of those countries were cast in the
role of defenders of privilege. The ideological battles were hard fought and long drawn out.
The disputed right of self-determination, at length made its way into both draft United
Nations Covenants. Economic and social rights were sometimes accorded a priority over
civil and political rights and freedoms. The draft Covenants were themselves delayed so
that priority might be given to the completion of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.
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The major decisions taken by the General Assembly in human rights matters are therefore
part and parcel of the international political process. They have, for example, helped to
mould a climate of United Nations opinion which calls for the earliest possible end to
colonial regimes, and which reserves its deepest opprobrium for the practice of apartheid.
Yet the discussion of human rights questions in United Nations bodies is, for the most part, a
debate without an audience. Government representatives may reflect accurately enough the
outlook of the public in their own countries, but their action creates little awareness or
sense of involvement among their countrymen.
Human Rights Year was then a time for stock taking. In the international sphere, the
concept of human rights had proved to be a powerful political catalyst. In the domestic
sphere, the standards proclaimed in the Universal Declaration were widely recognised.
There, were, however, still no international procedures to vindicate the rule of law; and
there was no assurance that states would voluntarily assume the obligations set out in the
Covenants so recently adopted by the General Assembly.
It was frequently said that the era of international legislation must be followed by a
period of concentration upon measures of implementation; and the Human Rights
Commission has already turned its attention to that task. The remainder of this paper will
trace the Commission's efforts, and will attempt an assessment of their prospects of fruition.
THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
At its 1966 session, the Commission received from the Economic and Social Council (in
resolution 1102 (XL)) an invitation:
to consider as a matter of importance and urgency the question of the violation of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation
and of apartheid in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent
countries and territories, and to submit to the Council at its forty-first session its
recommendations on measures to halt those violations.
The Council's request was specifically related to complaints about conditions in
Southern Africa, and the general wording of the passage quoted was regarded in some
quarters as no more than a token concession to the principle of impartiality.
In the Commission, the Soviet representative in fact proposed that action should be
confined to the cases of dependent territories; but this view was not upheld by the majority.
The resolution finally adopted (2(XXII)) included a separate Part which addressed the
Council in these terms:
Informs the Council that, in order completely to deal with the question of violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in all countries, it will be necessary for the Commission to
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consider fully the means by which it may be more fully informed of violations of human rights
with a view to devising recommendations for measures to halt them.
The Commission decided also to consider at its next session:
the question of the Commission's tasks and functions and its role in relation to violations of
human rights in all countries...,
with special reference to situations in Southern Africa. This first step to review the
Commission's procedures, taken with the support of not less than fifteen of the Commission's
twenty-one members, was in due course approved by both the Council and the General
Assembly.
In 1967 the Human Rights Commission, now enlarged to thirty-two members to provide a
better balance of representation from Africa and Asia, decided (in resolution 8(XXIII)) to
give annual consideration to the question of violations and asked the Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to prepare a report on
violations from all available sources. This important resolution went on to seek a revision
of the decisions under which the Commission had, from its inception, denied its own
authority to take action in regard to complaints:
4. Requests the Economic and Social Council to authorise the Commission and the Sub-
Commission ... to examine information relevant to gross violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, such as apartheid in all its forms and manifestations...
5. Further requests authority, in appropriate cases, and after careful consideration of the
information thus made available to it ... to make a thorough study and investigation of
situations which reveal a consisent pattern of violations of human rights, and to report with
recommendations thereon to the Economic and Social Council;
6. Invites the Sub-Commission to bring to the attention of the Commission any situation
which it has reasonable cause to believe reveals a consistent pattern of violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, in any country, including policies of racial discrimination,
segregation and apartheid, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent
territories.
The resolution was sponsored by the delegations of Costa Rica, Dahomey, the
Philippines, Senegal and Sweden; and its crucial fifth paragraph was adopted with twenty-
five votes in favour, three against, and three abstentions. The representatives of Soviet bloc
countries argued that it was beyond the Commission's authority and capacity to undertake
action of a political, judicial or semi-judicial nature; but the argument received little other
support.
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The Economic and Social Council acceded (in resolution 1235(XLII)) to the Commission's
requests, while the Sub-Commission surprised its parent body by drawing attention (in
resolution 3(XX)) to situations which revealed "consistent patterns of violations of human
rights" in Greece and in Haiti. Thus, at its 1968 session, the Commission was for the first
time confronted with a proposal for action in regard to an alleged violation of human rights
occurring elsewhere than in southern Africa. There was great uncertainty and difference of
opinion about the response the Commission should make. In the extreme view of the
Tanzanian representative, the Sub-Commission should be rebuked for turning its attention
to situations other than those arising in southern Africa. In the view of many other
delegates, the Sub-Commission had acted properly, but the available information would not
warrant any conclusion condemning the Governments of Greece or Haiti. Some felt that, in
the absence of a preliminary examination, it would be difficult to exclude political
considerations from the Commission's debate. Some attacks were made upon Greece, and
upon other states in the course of debate. Some representatives, though feeling that nothing
should be done on this occasion, reaffirmed their support for the procedure to study
consistent patterns of violations. By tacit agreement it was at length decided that no
proposal would be pressed to the vote.
At its 1969 session the Commission received from the Sub-Commission (in resolution
2(XXI)) a proposed procedure for dealing with situations which appeared to reveal a
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Sub-
Commission's proposal, after the incorporation of minor amendments designed to strengthen
the safeguards, was adopted as resolution 17(XXV). This resolution authorises the Sub-
Commission
to appoint a working group consisting of not more than five of its members, with due regard to
geographical representation, to meet once a year in private meetings ... immediately before the
sessions of the Sub-Commission to consider all communications ... with a view to bringing to
the attention of the Sub-Commission those communications, if any, which reveal a consistent
pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms within the terms of
reference of the Sub-Commission.
The Sub-Commission is asked to consider in private meetings the communications
brought before it in accordance with the decision of the majority of the working group. If
the Sub-Commission then refers the matter to the Commission for further action, the
Commission will decide whether to embark on a full-scale investigation or, with the consent
of the state concerned, to appoint an ad hoc committee to look into the matter. All of the
steps taken by the Sub-Commission and by the Commission will remain confidential unless
and until the Commission decides to report to the Economic and Social Council.
In short, the procedure favoured by the Commission places its faith in quiet negotiation,
and contemplates publicity only as a last resort. The requirement for preliminary screening
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also protects the interest of the state under suspicion, for the representatives of three of the
main regional groups are required to produce a majority in the working group. This
resolution as a whole was adopted by fourteen votes in favour, four against, and ten
abstentions; but its key paragraph survived a motion to delete only on an equality of votes.
The matter will be taken no further during the present year, as the Economic and Social
Council has decided to seek the views of governments before acting on the Commission's
recommendation.
There are two other matters which call for briefer mention. In 1967 the delegations of
Costa Rica, Dahomey, the Philippines, Senegal and Sweden sponsored a draft resolution
(14(XXIII)) recommending the General Assembly to establish the office of United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, and outlining the High Commissioner's status and
duties. He would "possess the degree of independence and prestige required for the
performance of his functions under the authority of the General Assembly". He could upon
request give advice to any organ of the United Nations concerned with human rights; could
render assistance to any member state; would have access to all communications concerning
human rights; and would report on the progress made in giving effect to human rights
instruments.
These provisions followed the recommendations of the Working Group set up by the
Commission a year earlier, and it was stressed that the High Commissioner would in no way
impose his or her will on governments. Even so, the proposal was vigorously opposed by a
minority consisting of the three Soviet bloc delegations, together with those of India, Iraq,
the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia. These seven countries voted against the
resolution; France and Nigeria abstained; but the resolution had the support of twenty
delegations.
The General Assembly has not acted on the proposal to appoint a High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and opinion within the United Nations is probably more evenly divided on
this issue than the Commission's vote would indicate. Even the staunchest supporters of the
High Commissioner proposal have tended to recognise that the value of the office would
depend on the goodwill which is commanded. With no consensus in view, it is perhaps
unlikely that the issue will be revived in the early future.
Finally, there was a proposal, pressed by Nigeria in 1967 and 1968, noting the existence
of regional commissions on human rights in Western Europe and in Latin America, and
establishing a Study Group to consider the question of creating similar bodies in other
regions. The proposal received no very determined support, and was emphatically opposed
by India and by the Soviet bloc countries. Predictably, the Study Group set up in 1967 could
reach no consensus; and the Commission, faced with this result, merely referred the matter to
Governments.
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The point which most clearly emerges is that India, with some justification, regards her
vast population as a region in itself, and is unwilling to be grouped with smaller and
unsympathetic neighbours. For the rest, the Nigerian initiative probably gives little
indication of the prospects of regional development. Wherever there is opportunity for
consolidation of national attitudes and defence of comn-en standards, regional or sub-
regional groupings will have an appeal. It is particularly noteworthy that the question of
African regional development will this year be discussed at a human rights seminar to be
held in Cairo.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
It is worth stressing that, on human rights issues, there is seldom a rigid voting pattern.
A project such as that of establishing the office of High Commissioner has many enemies; but
it also has warm, active support in every regional grouping except that of Eastern Europe.
The critical vote on setting up a procedure to deal with complaints about violations of
human rights was more polarised: but the Philippines and Iran adhered to the
predominantly Latin American and Western European position supporting the procedures
recommended; Italy voted with those opposed, in the company of the Eastern Europeans, and
of most Asians and Africans; Austria, France, Greece, Pakistan and the Congo abstained.
On any question of including references to colonialism or racial discrimination the
Western dissenters will of course be isolated, but they will usually obtain substantial and
varied support in resisting a move to confine the thrust of a general recommendation to
colonial matters.
This small margin of latitude for even-handedness - not very ommon in political
decision-making - is one of the main reasons for choosing to raise issues in a human rights
context. Doctrine was forged in the Third Committee in regard to such questions as "self-
determination" because states - which might have been inhibited in casting a vote against the
particular interest of a friendly power - felt free to declare their true colours in a "non-
political" vote of general principle.
Conversely, the need to declare a general position, instead of voting inscrutably on a
particular issue, might pose a problem of consistency for a delegation which was vulnerable
to reason. This was, and is, an object of manoeuvre - and, more than that, a way of enlarging
the no-man's land in which actions have their real value.
In the field of human rights, one hopes to get a step nearer the truth. That is why some
delegations find it worthwhile to uphold a single standard - knowing that a vote won under
these conditions has an enhanced value. For similar reasons, and believing in their cause,
delegations may welcome the institution of a complaints procedure. A verdict against
apartheid in a semi-judicial proceeding is worth more than the registration of an automatic
majority vote.
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It does not follow that delegations will feel able to support a policy of objectivity, if
their own national record seems impeachable. "To the sovereign nation-state, its own needs
and conscience are the ultimate criteria of right and wrong and of law and justice". I It is no
reproach to the doctrine of human rights that it shares the peril which unbridled national
sovereignty poses for international order.
De Visscher, sharing Lauterpacht's esteem for "the profound influence of human values
in the establishment of an international order", gives his customary warning about building
legal castles in the air. 'The bond that is being established beyond any shadow of doubt
between the rights of man on the one hand, and the maintenance of peace and respect for law
on the other, constitutes the first assertion of the international organisation of a great moral
and civilising principle. We must neither count upon its immediate efficacy, nor reject the
hopes that it awakens".
5
For Moskowitz, there can be no rest or respite until the dragon of national sovereignty
has been slain. Tirelessly he exposes the monster's capacity for evil and its immunity to
half-measures. To escape the curse, mankind must undergo nothing less than a spiritual and
intellectual conversion. The aims of the Charter must be fulfilled. 'The true and concrete
incarnation of the international idea is man himself'.6
My head is with de Visscher and ny heart is with Moskowitz. It seems to me clear
enough that there can be no co-existence with the dragon of national sovereignty. If we
cannot close ranks against him, he will make fools of us all. In that not unlikely event, there
will still be value in cleaving to the doctrine of human rights at whatever level of
achievement has proved attainable. Even if the goal of international protection were
abandoned, the doctrine would still have a capacity to humanise, and to reconcile
ideological differences. That has been put persuasively by Bystricky of Czechoslovakia: 7
I should like to point out that the problem of human rights and freedoms is once again a topic
of penetrating debate in the socialist countries....The tendency is to abandon the deep-rooted
idea that there is a higher interest of society in contrast to the subordinate interests of the
individual and that the purpose of law is to bridge these contradictory interests of the
individual and society... .In my country - and, I suppose, in other socialist countries as well -
4 Moses Moskowitz The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights (Oceana Publications, New York, 1968)
[The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights].
5 Charles de Visscher Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1968) 126, 134.
6 The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights above n 4, 210.
7 Bystricky in Eide & Schow (eds) Nobel Symposium 7 International Protection of Human Rights (1968)
91-2.
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political theory has discarded its previous and erroneous views on the total discontinuity of
the development of human and civil rights, and is closely following the trends in democratic
world public opinion and political practice.
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